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4.  Deals 
In his wonderful book, Capitalism, Democracy and Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery, Ohio State 
University professor John Mueller stresses trust as an essential element in deal making. Trust 
enabled some of the most substantial deals in American industrial history:  
People in American business rely on trust and reputation to make deals happen. 
For example, the agreements between Standard Oil and the railroads in the 
nineteenth century, of enormous economic consequence to both parties, were 
mostly sealed simply with a handshake. Indeed, if there is even a small chance 
that the courts would be required to make a deal work, the deal will probably not 
be consummated in the first place. [Where] trust has arduously, and profitably, 
been built up, efforts to further guarantee honesty by mechanical legalistic devices 
could actually be counterproductive.
1
 
Although most players in corporate America defer to the formality associated with legal 
contracts, bargains often go forward without them. Warren Buffett prefers the informal route, 
although elaborate formal agreements are unavoidable in many circumstances. Buffett’s views 
and experiences with contracts, a subject almost never discussed in the thousands of books or 
articles on Buffett, offer insights into his profound preference for trust. 
Informal Promises 
Begin with two of the most famous of the many informal promises Buffett has made repeatedly 
since taking control of Berkshire in 1965 through to today. The first concerns his regular 
declaration that he regards Berkshire as a partnership, not a corporation, among all shareholders. 
This conception is the first of a dozen operating principles Berkshire publishes in its annual 
reports, dating to the mid-1980s, and has included in every one since 1995. 
If there is a partnership, then Buffett and the rest of Berkshire’s leadership owe owners 
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far more stringent loyalty oaths than the fiduciary duties law puts on corporate directors. If taken 
at face value, Buffett’s repeated statements suffice to form a partnership as a legal matter. 
In context, they are aspirational statements of business philosophy to convey a conviction 
that shareholders are owners along with Buffett. No one has sued over this—and no such claim is 
imaginable given that Buffett and Berkshire’s other leaders have undoubtedly met even the 
highest standards of partnership obligation. 
With each passing year, as Buffett both repeats and honors this loyalty oath, the 
commitment strengthens while the deference he gets to deliver it widens. Such loyalty is an 
example of how to build a reservoir of goodwill through a business practice rather than a legal 
contract. It illustrates one of Muller’s points noted in the quotation from Ralph’s Pretty Good 
Grocery: “[Where] trust has arduously, and profitably, been built up, efforts to further guarantee 
honesty by mechanical legalistic devices could actually be counterproductive.”
 
 
Second, for forty years, Buffett has repeatedly declared, in official Berkshire documents, 
presentations, and commentary, that when Berkshire acquires a company, it intends to hold it 
forever. And he has made good on that overture—retaining even companies that struggle 
financially. This is a claim on which sellers invariably place a great deal of trust in Buffett.
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Berkshire makes the specific point in acquisition discussions and it is often a basic 
rationale for many sellers to Berkshire, especially families and entrepreneurs, who value the 
commitment of permanence. But no such promises appear in the formal acquisition agreements 
Berkshire signs. That makes sense because an intention, backed by practice, is probably all that 
can realistically be given and provides the seller a sufficient basis to proceed. 
Suppose, moreover, a seller requested Buffett or Berkshire to put the commitment in 
writing in a legally binding contract. Their signal could be construed as mistrust, which might 
doom the deal. To quote again from Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery: “if there is even a small 
chance that the courts would be required to make a deal work, the deal will probably not be 






In the past two decades, Berkshire acquired nearly twenty public companies.
3
 The deals are 
memorialized in highly formalized contracts, dictated by the practices of public companies. The 
common focus in these and all such acquisitions is on the seller’s financial statements, which it 
represents to be fairly stated and on which any buyer relies. 
These financial statement representations are elaborated in great detail. They explicitly 
reference arcane points: encompassing notes to the financial statements, schedules to securities 
law filings, the balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement—all as of specified 
dates or time periods; in accordance with a specific set of accounting standards, such as 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), or some other comprehensive basis of accounting; and subject to a separate schedule 
enumerating exceptions. 
Lawyers and business people invest significant effort in delineating the financial 
statement representation to reduce any doubt about exactly what each side has agreed to. They 
try to leave no wiggle room for either side to later argue that the commitment was ambiguous or 
that some issues had not been decided. In effect, both sides aim to preclude the other from 
arguing, in court, that a judge should set aside the plain terms of the writing in favor of listening 
to testimony about the surrounding context. 
Two of Berkshire’s earliest acquisitions had very different financial statement warranties. 
Buffett has recounted these stories in the 2013 and 2014 shareholder letters, recalling deals that 
came to define Berkshire. At the time, they not only were critical acquisitions but also involved 
personal characteristics that warranted a different touch: one selling group was a family and the 
other was a friend of Buffett’s. 
The first example describes one of Berkshire’s earliest and still historically most 
important acquisitions in terms of size—the 1967 purchase of National Indemnity Co. (NICO), 
today the world’s largest property and casualty insurance company: 
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[Insurance] has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, 
when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & 
Marine, for $8.6 million. Though that purchase had monumental consequences for 
Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself. 
Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling shareholder of the 
two companies, came to my office saying he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes 
later, we had a deal. Neither of Jack’s companies had ever had an audit by a 
public accounting firm, and I didn’t ask for one. My reasoning: (1) Jack was 
honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and likely to walk away if the deal 
became at all complicated. 
The purchase agreement we used to finalize the transaction was 1-½-pages 
long. That contract was homemade: Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has 
to be Berkshire’s best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (generally 
accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111 billion, which exceeds that of 
any other insurer in the world. 
The second example describes one of Berkshire’s earliest family-company acquisitions, 
which likewise was among the most important for establishing Berkshire’s trust-based approach 
to its relationships—the 1983 purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM), then owned by the 
Blumkin family: 
I went to see Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), carrying a 1-¼-page purchase proposal for 
NFM that I had drafted. Mrs. B accepted my offer without changing a word, and 
we completed the deal without the involvement of investment bankers or lawyers 
(an experience that can only be described as heavenly). Though the company’s 
financial statements were unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B simply told me 
what was what, and her word was good enough for me. 
The circumstances of both NICO and NFM show extraordinary trust. Berkshire made 
these substantial acquisitions on informal terms. One of the central elements of such a deal, the 
financial statements, is accepted with a broad general statement of their veracity by an individual 
Buffett trusted. Yet, what would have happened had the financial statements turned out to be 
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inaccurate or if Buffett’s interpretation of the relevant accounting differed from that of either 
NICO or NFM? 
In traditional formal contracts, financial statement representations provide rules to 
resolve such fights, such as that the statements are “fairly presented” or “comply with GAAP.” 
But under these informal contracts, there are no such rules. Resolving any disagreement would 
require an understanding of the context of the business, the negotiations, and what each side 
understood about both. 
Maybe Buffett simply assumed that he and both Ringwalt and Blumkin either would have 
had a shared understanding or would have been able to work out any difference. If they needed 
to turn to an impartial arbiter to decide, such as a court, the arbiter would need to gather a 
substantial amount of information beyond the limited guidelines included in the informal 
contracts. 
The upshot is the enormous level of trust among these parties. If industrial America’s 
most consequential formative deals were those between big oil and the railroads, Berkshire’s 
were those with NICO and NFM. Those early purchases established Buffett and Berkshire’s 
reputations as believers in trust. Buffett’s decision to retell these stories from 1967 and 1983 in 
his letters of 2013 and 2014 affirms his continuing conviction to the value of trust. 
Best Efforts and Good Cause 
Many acquisitions require multiple agreements, such as both a formal merger agreement and 
separate employment contracts for key executives. One example concerned Berkshire’s 
acquisition of the Scott Fetzer Company in 1986. Berkshire was a white knight amid hostile 
takeover overtures that put Scott Fetzer “in play.” 
The merger agreement was signed for Berkshire, and largely written, by Charlie 
Munger.
4
 It spanned just four pages when first executed and only eight pages upon being 
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amended and restated in final form—about 20 percent the average length of merger agreements 
at the time. 
Some provisions are common and straightforward. For example, among a few simple 
representations, the central one concerns financial statements and securities law filings. 
Likewise, one clause limited Scott Fetzer’s rights to talk to other potential suitors who might be 
willing to pay more (a “no-talk” clause). 
Then there were some novel provisions. For one, while state law required only a majority 
shareholder vote to approve the deal on the Scott Fetzer side, the contract called for a 
supermajority of two-thirds. In addition, the no-talk clause omitted any exception that would 
have allowed the board to talk to third parties if the board’s fiduciary duty required it to do so.
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On the contrary, the contract required Scott Fetzer’s board to use its “best efforts” to close 
the Berkshire deal. This is a vague general concept whose meaning depends on context. To 
provide some context, however, this best efforts clause added a further novel and specific 
requirement: if the two-thirds vote were not received, Scott Fetzer would call another meeting 
the next quarter and “proceed with extraordinary diligence” to obtain the required votes. The 
contract then explains its purpose, another rare feature in typical merger agreements: 
The purpose of the two-possible-stockholder-solicitations procedure is (i) to cause 
the first (and probably only) solicitation to be scheduled early to facilitate early 
payment of merger proceeds to Scott Fetzer shareholders and (ii) to assure that 
Parent, an extremely creditworthy and responsible corporation which is 
committed to the proposed merger with minimal contingencies, for the benefit of 
Scott Fetzer shareholders, will remain committed to the Merger for an extended 
period of time and will receive for its benefit in exchange for its commitment, a 
very thorough consideration of the terms of the proposed transaction by Scott 
Fetzer shareholders, the mutual commitments being deemed reasonable because 
the Agreement is submitted to an inherently demanding test of approval by two-
thirds of Scott Fetzer outstanding shares. 
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The brevity, novelty, and clarity of this agreement are bracing. The approach 
distinguishes it from many others, and reflects a sophistication that would jump out at any judge 
interpreting the contract. The scope of most “best efforts” clauses would usually require attention 
to context, but the plain words accompanying this clause leave no mistake about what duty the 
parties wanted the board to have. 
As written, the best efforts clause applied no matter what—even if corporate fiduciary 
duties might require the board to discuss a potentially better deal with other suitors. Courts have 
a hard time taking such clauses at face value and sometimes say fiduciaries cannot make a 
contract that eliminates their fiduciary duties.
6
 Thus, a tension often exists between the 
contract’s plain meaning and the deal’s context. 
In this case, the context is a white knight acquisition competing with at least one hostile 
bid that the Scott Fetzer board was determined to resist. Scott Fetzer and Berkshire both likely 
preferred the tightest possible clause. They seemed to have trusted each other very much, and 
mistrusted all other suitors intensely. 
The Scott Fetzer acquisition agreement also called for Berkshire to honor the seller’s 
existing senior executive employment agreements. On this point, Berkshire made a separate 
employment contract with the CEO, Ralph Schey, about which Buffett wrote in his chairman’s 
letter to Berkshire shareholders a few years later: 
Our compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five 
minutes, immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the “help” of 
lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a few very 
simple ideas—not the kind of terms favored by consultants who cannot easily 
send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large problem (and 
one, of course, that requires an annual review). 
Our agreement with Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him 
and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with 
the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each 
agreement vary to fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the 
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existence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc. 
In the Scott Fetzer transactions, we have two different kinds of agreements: a formal 
merger agreement (if an unusually short one) and an informal employment agreement (although 
one obviously containing key compensation terms). They are different for good reasons. The 
merger agreement serves a specific discrete and temporary one-off function—that is, the Scott 
Fetzer board getting the Scott Fetzer shareholders to approve the merger so that it can be closed 
and ownership can be acquired. A degree of trust is important, and the fewer provisions in the 
agreement the better. It is easy to zero in on exactly what’s important without addressing 
anything else. 
Unlike a merger agreement, an employment agreement addresses an ongoing working 
relationship of indefinite duration—it lasted fourteen years through Schey’s retirement at 
seventy-five. Compensation and incentives are important, but it’s hard to say what will matter 
most. When employment contracts specify an employee’s duties, they usually contain broad 
general language, such as requiring the employee to exert his or her “best efforts” on the 
employer’s behalf. Such a contract relies heavily on trust and the ability to determine the specific 
obligations it entails depends on context. 
Berkshire usually carries over incumbent managers’ contracts upon acquisition—and 
some are elaborate. Take that of David Sokol, head of MidAmerican Energy Company when 
Berkshire acquired it in 2000. The contract is fifteen single-spaced pages, with excruciating 
detail, including intricate treatment of termination. 
Sokol was among Berkshire’s most visible subsidiary CEOs and was widely seen as 
Buffett’s successor. Yet, in 2014, he embroiled Berkshire in controversy by allegedly front 
running—that is, buying stock in a company before pitching it to Buffett as an acquisition target. 
The contract was pivotal because it restricted the company’s termination right under a tight 
definition of “good cause.” 
The definition runs 425 words; subdefines legal concepts like “willful”; sets 
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qualifications like gross misconduct and demonstrable injury; and requires advance warning of 
deficiencies and passage of a board resolution meeting stated criteria. For an executive in 
trouble, this provides strict plain parameters; a court need not even look up “willful” in a law 
dictionary. 
But consider an executive who is in trouble under a vague contract, akin to how Buffett 
described the Schey deal. If the contract sets a term for a period of years, a legitimate reason 
(“good cause”) would be needed to terminate. But exactly what that cause would be depends on 
both general legal definitions and the specifics of the contract. 
Presumably front running would qualify, so Sokol would have been out under such a 
contract. After all, disappointed trust should be readily remedied. Under Sokol’s actual contract, 
however, negotiated not by Berkshire but by the predecessor MidAmerican Energy, Berkshire’s 
termination was more difficult. Sokol’s lawyer even claimed the agreement permitted front 
running. 
In the end, Berkshire followed the procedures and was able to terminate Sokol. The 
detailed contractual provisions required such corporate exertions, terms emanating not from a 
reservoir of trust but instead from mechanistic legalese. (We detail this episode further from 
additional perspectives in the epilogue.) 
The Spirit and the Letter 
At stake in the degree of formality or informality used to create and interpret contracts is what 
matters more, the letter or the spirit of agreement. On this issue, another pair of Berkshire 
contracts illustrates how an informal promise can be observed solemnly, whereas a formal one 
can be observed conditionally. 
In each example, Berkshire acquired a public company with a family-held bloc concerned 
with aspects of history or operations: in 2000, the paint manufacturer Benjamin Moore & Co., 
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which had a longstanding commitment to an independent distributor model rather than big box 
retailers; and, in 2013, the condiment maker H. J. Heinz Company, which had an abiding loyalty 
to its hometown community of Pittsburgh. 
One major difference marks these deals: Berkshire acquired all of Benjamin Moore, 
whereas Berkshire acquired Heinz in partnership with the private equity firm, 3G, which called 
most of the shots. 
With Benjamin Moore, several contracts were signed, including a formal merger 
agreement and a shareholders’ agreement committing Moore family members and other insiders 
to the transaction. All participants appreciated the centrality of the independent distributor 
system to the company as related public disclosure made plain. 
The formal agreements contained no related promises. Shortly after closing, however, 
hearing concerns from distributors about continuity, Buffett made a video in which he expressly 
promised to maintain the system and not sell through big box retailers. Over ensuing years, when 
two successive CEOs at Moore signaled their willingness to break that promise out of business 
necessity, Buffett intervened to remove them, citing his commitment. 
In Heinz, the merger agreement devoted an entire section to the company’s cultural 
connection to Pittsburgh. It declared “that after the Closing, the Company’s current headquarters 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania will be the Surviving Corporation’s headquarters.” 
A covenant, which survives the closing and is made by the acquisition subsidiary 
Berkshire jointly owned (called the “Parent”), promises: “after the Closing, Parent shall cause 
the Surviving Corporation to preserve the Company’s heritage and continue to support 
philanthropic and charitable causes in Pittsburgh.” 
The contract referenced the company’s contractual right to name Pittsburgh’s professional 
athletic stadium, called Heinz Field, and required keeping that name. The contract required the 
parties to reference these commitments in their press releases about the deal. 
But within a year of the Heinz deal, the company, led by managers appointed by 
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Berkshire’s coacquirer, 3G, cut three hundred jobs at it Pittsburgh headquarters. A further 
Pittsburgh dilution occurred soon thereafter, when Heinz merged with Chicago-based Kraft 
Foods Group to form the Kraft Heinz Company. 
Although the company adopted dual headquarters and asserted it was keeping its 
Pittsburgh covenants, locals perceived a hollowing out and migration to Chicago. The actions 
may not have violated the covenants, but the reasonable questions  stand in contrast to Moore. At 
Moore, a most informal promise was honored with spirited punctiliousness, whereas at Heinz, a 
highly formalized agreement was managed technically. 
What of enforcement? In Moore, the circumstances might warrant letting the distributors 
enforce Buffett’s promise. Amid known distributor centrality and concerns, express promises are 
made directly to distributors who, if induced to remain, would be entitled to enforce the promise. 
Although Buffett’s exact words didn’t actually make a corporate promise, such a major 
commitment to an independent distributor model would probably require approval of the 
company’s board, not just the chief executive. 
In Heinz, the language is less precise or ironclad than one might expect of a long-term 
corporate promise to maintain the company’s connection to Pittsburgh. For instance, there’s no 
time frame (just repeatedly saying “from and after Closing”) or benchmarks (only vague 
references to “preserving heritage” and “supporting charities”). 
In addition, the Heinz promises are made by the buyer, which, upon closing, owns the 
seller and will not sue itself for breach. The agreement disclaims third-party enforcement rights 
other than stated exceptions, such as option holders and personnel covered by indemnification. 
There’s no mention of, say, Pittsburgh headquarters’ personnel, Pittsburgh charities, or the Heinz 
family. As a formal matter, it seems there is either no promise at all or, at best, a promise without 
a plaintiff. 
But what about the circumstances? To Buffett, who believes in trust, the agreement 
memorializes a commitment—with imprecision that is understandable given the context. You 
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might even say a conflict exists between the Pittsburgh promises and the no-third-party-rights 
clause, which would require more information to determine what was really intended by the 
clause. That conflict might suggest that the Pittsburgh promises were included only as a publicity 
stunt. If that seems deceptive, you could imagine letting the Pittsburgh interests have their day in 
court. 
The Moore promise seems to be an avuncular assurance of intention rather than a 
contractual commitment—much like Buffett’s vows of permanence, which he also uttered in the 
video. Likewise, the Heinz agreement may well involve an expression of “intent for the time 
being,” statements of business conviction rather than legal covenant—much like Buffett’s vows 
of Berkshire as a partnership. Ultimately, however, the Heinz contract and subsequent actions 
look more like a typical corporate approach to an acquisition than the more trust-animated 
Berkshire approach. The inclusion of 3G in the Heinz acquisition likely explains this difference. 
(This transaction, and private equity generally, are discussed further in chapter 7.) 
 
A famous line appears in the annals of corporate acquisition agreements: “In Texas, a handshake 
is a contract.” That argument persuaded a Texas jury in 1985 to find Texaco guilty of wrongfully 
disrupting a merger between Getty Oil and Pennzoil. The formal elaborate merger contract was 
never signed, but the jury’s $10 billion verdict sent Texaco into bankruptcy.
7
 Whether that is a 
good law or wise public policy, people do rely on informal promises to bind. This is a practice 
worth heeding, even when knowing that many legal details must be left for the formal printed 
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